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Utah's Short Statutes of Limitation for Tax Titles: 
The Continuing Specter of Lyman u. National 
Mortgage Bond Corp. -A Need for Remedial 
Legislation 
Phillip Wm. Lear* 
Courts have generally favored the delinquent taxpayer over 
the tax title purchaser when adjudicating rights in real property 
that has been sold for taxes.' The Supreme Court of Utah is no 
excep t i~n .~  Some 40 years ago, in an effort to afford tax titles 
some degree of respectability and stability, the Utah legislature 
inaugurated a program of remedial legi~lation.~ A major portion 
of the legislative activity involved the enactment of "short" stat- 
utes of limitation. In a series of four provisos, the legislature 
enacted a 4-year statute of limitations that barred defenses to tax 
titles where the delinquent owner or his successor had been out 
of possession for 4 years prior to commencement of the action,l 
and reduced the prescriptive period for ownership by adverse 
possession from 7 to 4 years.5 
Ambiguities in the statutes, however, coupled with the 
courts' inconsistent interpretations of legislative intent have en- 
veloped these short statutes of limitation in a cloud of judicial 
uncertainty that places their continued effectiveness in doubt. 
The practical effect of this is far-reaching. First, title examiners 
cannot rely on the statutes to nullify defects that should no longer 
be subject to attack. As a consequence, prospective sellers are 
* B.A., University of Utah, 1969; J.D., University of Utah, 1975. Member, Utah State 
Bar. 
1. See, e.g., Consolidated Motors, Inc. v. Skousen, 56 Ariz. 481, 487-88, 109 P.2d 41, 
44 (1941); Colpitts v. Fastenau, 117 Colo. 594, 597, 192 P.2d 524, 526-27 (1948). 
2. See, e.g., Salt Lake Home Builders, Inc. v. Colman, 30 Utah 2d 379, 518 P.2d 165 
(1974), noted in 1974 UTAH L. REV. 121; Toronto v. Sheffield, 118 Utah 460, 222 P.2d 594 
(1950); Telonis v. Staley, 104 Utah 539, 144 P.2d 513 (1943). In addition, see 6 UTAH L. 
REV. 284, 285 (1958); 3 UTAH L. REV. 97 (1952). 
3. ~ J T A H  CODE ANN. § 59-10-36 (1953) provides that a certified record of tax sale 
proceedings is prima facie evidence of their regularity and shifts the burden to the delin- 
quent owner to show any irregularity. This represents a radical change from the traditional 
approach. As a consequence of this statute, the risk assumed by the purchaser, should tax 
title prove invalid, is reduced by giving him a lien against the delinquent property to the 
extent of taxes, interest, and penalties paid. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 59-10-65 (1953); see 1974 
IJTAH I , .  REV. 121, 122. 
4. ~ J T A H  CODE ANN. $ 4  78-12-5.1, -5.2 (Supp. 1975). 
5. ~ J T A H  CODE ANN. $ 4  78-12-7.1, -12.1 (Supp. 1975). 
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required to pay additional and often exorbitant hazard premiums 
for policies of title insurance on properties that have tax deeds in 
the chain of title. Occasionally, title insurance is refused alto- 
gether. The second consequence is that tax titles are undesirable 
and lack marketability; they are often avoided except for their 
nuisance value. As a result, properties that could be placed into 
revenue-generating posture often remain in the ownership of the 
county, lying fallow for tax purposes. 
This article first will review the statutes, their interpretive 
case law, and theoretical underpinnings. Then, it will propose 
amendments to the current statutory format that should work to 
ameliorate what has become an intolerable s i t u a t i ~ n . ~  
The four provisos that comprise Utah's "short statutes of 
limitation"' represent the latest legislative effort to stabilize tax 
titles. This statutory package can be divided into three parts: (1) 
statutes limiting actions involving affirmative relief or defenses; 
(2) statutes of limitation dealing with land held in adverse posses- 
sion; and (3) a definition statute. 
A. Limitation of Actions 
Section 78-12-5.2 bars defenses to tax titles and actions to 
recover property forfeited for failure to pay assessed property 
taxes. In general terms, this statute reduces from 7 to 4 years the 
period in which the landowner dispossessed by a tax sale or his 
successor in interest can maintain a cause of action to quiet title 
to real property or interpose any defense against the tax title 
holder? The statute commences to run upon the date of the sale, 
6. For a survey of tax sale procedures and related tax title problems in Utah see 
Comment, Tax Sales and Tax Titles in Utah: Windfalls and Windstorms, 1 J .  CONTEMP. 
I,. 299 (1975). 
7. The designation "short statutes of limitation" is used to identify special shortened 
statutes of limitation that were enacted in most jurisdictions during the Great Depression 
to bring repose to titles originating in the increased number of tax sales during that period. 
Traditional periods of limitation were abandoned wherever tax titles were involved. This 
general designation includes within its scope adverse possession statutes pertaining to tax 
titles. See I11 infra. 
8. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-5.2 (Supp. 1975) reads: 
Holder of tax title--Limitations of action or defense--Proviso.-No ac- 
tion or defense for the recovery or possession of real property or to quiet title or 
determine the ownership thereof shall be commenced or interposed against the 
holder of a tax title after the expiration of four years from the date of the sale, 
conveyance or transfer of such tax title to any county, or directly to any other 
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conveyance, or transfer that creates the tax title? The statute 
does not, however, operate to bar the dispossessed landowner or 
his successor from instituting an action or interposing a defense 
if he or his successor occupied or enjoyed possession a t  any time 
within 4 years preceding commencement of the action or assertion 
of the defense.'" 
A companion proviso, section 78-12-5.1, requires occupation 
or possession of the property within the 4-year period immedi- 
ately preceding commencement of the action or defense as a con- 
dition precedent to any action or interposition of a defense 
brought by the dispossessed landowner or his successor in inter- 
est. " 
purchase thereof a t  any public or private tax sale and after the expiration of one 
year from the date of this act. Provided, however, that this section shall not bar 
any action or defense by the owner of the legal title to such property where he 
or his predecessor has actually occupied or been in actual possession of such 
property within four years from the commencement or interposition of such 
action or defense. And provided further, that this section shall not bar any 
defense by a city or town, to an action by the holder of a tax title, to the effect 
that such city or town holds a lien against such property which is equal or 
superior to the claim of the holder of such tax title. 
The statutory period for actions or defenses founded upon title to real estate is found in 
the parent sections to be 7 years. UTAH CODE ANN. $5 78-12-5, -6 (1953). 
For similar statutes in neighboring jurisdictions see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 54 42-451, 
-452 (1956) (if dispossessed owner does not redeem within 3 years from date of sale, action 
may be initiated by tax sale purchaser to foreclose right of redemption, after which 
redemption and recovery claims are forever barred); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE $ 5  3725-31 
(West 1970) (1-year statute from date of execution of tax deed for both private sale and 
sales where property is struck off to the county); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 39-12-101 (1973) 
(5-year statute from date of delivery of the tax deed); IDAHO CODE $63-1143 (Supp. 1974) 
(6-year statute from date of tax deed which also requires a concurrent 6 years of peaceable 
possession and payment of taxes); NEV. REV. STAT. 5 361.600 (1973) (3-year statute from 
date of execution and delivery of tax deed); N.M. STAT. ANN. 9 72-8-21 (1953) (2-year 
statute from date of sale); WYO. STAT. ANN. 5 39-141 (1957) (6-year statute from date of 
sale). 
9. IJTAH CODE ANN. $ 78-12-5.2 (Supp. 1975). 
10. Id. 
11. UTAH CODE ANN. # 78-12-5.1 (Supp, 1975) reads: 
Seizure or possession within seven years-Proviso-Tax title.-No ac- 
tion for the recovery of real property or for the possession thereof shall be main- 
tained, unless the plaintiff or his predecessor was seized or possessed of such 
property within seven years from the commencement of such action; provided, 
however, that with respect to actions or defenses brought or interposed for the 
recovery or possession of or to quiet title or determine the ownership of real 
property against the holder of a tax title to such property, no such action or 
defense shall be commenced or interposed more than four years after the date 
of the tax deed, conveyance, or transfer creating such tax title unless the person 
commencing or interposing such action or defense or his predecessor has actually 
occupied or been in possession of such property within four years prior to the 
commencement or interposition of such action or defense or within one year from 
the effective date of this amendment. 
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B. Adverse Possession 
The statutes setting forth a prescriptive period for ownership 
by adverse possession are found in sections 78-12-7. ll%nd 78-12- 
12.1.':' These provisos establish an avenue to ownership of real 
property obtained under a tax sale proceeding where the tax deed, 
defective so as to convey no title, renders the limitation of action 
statutes inapplicable. Where the tax title holder establishes by 
prima facie evidence that  he or his predecessor has been the 
owner of real property under a tax title for the 4-year period prior 
to commencement of the action, he is considered to be the owner 
by adverse possession. No adverse possession may be established 
under these provisos, however, if, within the 4 years prior to the 
12. IJTAH CODE ANN. 4 78-12-7.1 (Supp. 1975) reads: 
Adverse possession-Presumption-Proviso-Tax title.-In every ac- 
tion for the recovery or possession of real property or to quiet title to or deter- 
mine the owner thereof the person establishing a legal title to such property shall 
be presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time required by law; 
and the occupation of such property by any other person shall be deemed to have 
been under and in subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that such 
property has been held and possessed adversely to such legal title for seven years 
before the commencement of such action. Provided, however, that if in any 
action any party shall establish prima facie evidence that he is the owner of any 
real property under a tax title held by him and his predecessors for four years 
prior to the commencement of such action and one year after the effective date 
of this amendment he shall be presumed to be the owner of such property by 
adverse possession unless it appears that the owner of the legal title or his 
predecessor has actually occupied or been in possession of such property under 
such title or that such tax title owner and his predecessors have failed to pay 
all the taxes levied or assessed upon such property within such four-year period. 
13. ~ J T A H  CODE ANN. 4 78-12-12.1 (Supp. 1975) reads: 
Possession and payment of taxes-Proviso-Tax title.-In no case shall 
adverse possession be established under the provisions of this Code, unless it 
shall be shown that the land has been occupied and claimed for the period of 
seven years continuously, and that the party, his predecessors and grantors, 
have paid all the taxes which have been levied and assessed upon such land 
according to law. Provided, however, that payment by the holder of a tax title 
to real property or his predecessors, of all the taxes levied and assessed upon 
such real property after the delinquent tax sale or transfer under which he 
claims for a period of not less than four years and for not less than one year after 
the effective date of this amendment, shall be sufficient to satisfy the require- 
ments of this section in regard to the payment of taxes necessary to establish 
adverse possession. 
For similar statutes in neighboring jurisdictions see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-41- 
108 (1973) (7-year statute); IDAHO CODE 8 63-1143 (Supp. 1975) (no separate adverse 
possession statute); NEV. REV. STAT. 5 11.080 (1973) (no action for recovery may be main- 
tained unless the plaintiff, his ancestor, or predecessor in interest was seised or possessed 
of the premises 5 years before commencement of the action); N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 23-1-22 
(Supp. 1973) (10-year statute, and then only under color of title); WYO. STAT. ANN. 1-13 
(1957) (10 years of possession). 
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commencement of the action, (1) the dispossessed landowner has 
actually occupied or been in possession of the real property," or 
(2) the tax title holder or his predecessor has failed to pay all 
taxes levied.'" 
C.  "Tax Titles" and "Actions" Defined 
Section 78-12-5.3 was enacted to provide definitional support 
to the terms "tax title" and "actions," found in the provisos. For 
purposes of these provisos, section 78-12-5.3 defines a tax title as 
any title to real property, whether valid or not, which has been 
derived through or is dependent upon any sale, conveyance, or 
transfer of such property in the course of a statutory proceeding 
for the liquidation of any tax levied against such property 
whereby the property is relieved from the tax lien. 
"Action," as found in the limitation of action provisos discussed 
above, includes counterclaims and cross-complaints as well as all 
civil actions for affirmative relief.'" 
A. Due Process Challenge to the Validity of the Limiting 
Statutes: Hansen v. Morris 
Hansen u. Morris," the first case decided under the new short 
statutes of limitation, involved a constitutional challenge to the 
validity of the limiting statutes in sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12- 
5.2.IX The defendants had acquired property which they never 
occupied and upon which they had failed to pay taxes. The prop- 
erty was deeded to the county following the "May sale"'!' and 
subsequently conveyed to the plaintiffs predecessor in interest. 
Defendants contended that the tax title conveyed no interest 
since the plaintiff had failed to prove all statutory steps incident 
to perfection of the tax title and therefore the statute of limita- 
14. IJTAH CODE ANN. 5 78-12-7.1 (Supp. 1975). 
15. Id. 5 78-12-7.1, -12.1. 
16. Id. Q 78-12-5.3. 
17. 3 Utah 2d 310, 283 P.2d 884 (1955). 
18. Other relevant issues raised by the defendant were (1) that plaintiff's failure to 
plead the statutes precluded his reliance thereon on appeal, and (2) that the repeal of the  
parent limitations statute by enactment bearing the same date as the provisos in fact 
repealed the short statutes and thus they did not exist. Id. a t  312, 283 P.2d a t  885. 
19. Property not redeemed within the 4-year statutory redemption period is subject, 
after proper notice by the county, to sale by the county auditor or his deputy a t  an annual 
sale in May. See 1974 IJTAH I,. REV. 121. 
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tions did not apply. Defendants further argued that even if the 
statute did apply, it was unconstitutional because it deprived 
them of property without due pro~ess.~" The court held that the 
limitation of actions statutes did not deprive the dispossessed 
landowner of property without due process where the tax deed is 
valid on its face and the governmental officials had authority to 
issue the deed? There was no claim in Hansen that the deed was 
not valid on its face or that it was not issued by the proper govern- 
mental authority. 
The court expressly limited its holding in Hansen (and 
thereby the constitutional operation of the limitation of actions 
statutes) to cases in which the tax deeds are valid on their faces 
and have been issued by competent authority after all statutory 
steps have been followed.22 Therefore, application of the statutes 
to void or validate deeds issued by officials lacking statutory 
authority would presumably deprive a delinquent owner of prop- 
erty without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment .23 
B. Judicial Recognition of Ambiguity in  the Statutes: 
Peterson v. Callister 
The import of Peterson u. Callisterz4 is twofold. First, the 
case manifests judicial recognition of and concurrence with the 
purpose of the limitation of actions statutes. Second, it identifies 
certain ambiguous statutory language which confuses interpreta- 
tion of the legislature's intent. In Peterson, after defendant's 
predecessor in interest failed to pay taxes on the property, it was 
struck off to the county at  a tax sale. The plaintiff took a tax deed 
from the county and then occupied the land. Both the auditor's 
deed to and the tax deed from the county were recorded, although 
unacknowledged.2~ubsequently, defendant came into ownership 
20. 3 Utah 2d a t  315, 283 P.2d at  887. 
21. 3 Utah 2d at 315, 283 P.2d at  887, citing Geekie v. Kirby Carpenter Co., 106 U S .  
379,384 (1882). In that case the United States Supreme Court held that a Wisconsin short 
statute of limitations similar to the one chaIlenged in Hansen did not violate due process. 
22. 3 Utah 2d at 315, 283 P.2d a t  887. 
23. See Kanawha & Hocking Coal & Coke Co. v. Carbon County, No. 13853 (Sup. 
Ct. Utah, May 6, 1975) (dissenting opinion). 
24. 6 Utah 2d 359, 313 P.2d 814 (1957). 
25. lJtah law requires a deed to be acknowledged before it can be recorded. UTAH 
Corx ANN. 4 57-3-1 (1953). However, failure to append the acknowledgment to the deed 
does not invalidate the deed as a conveyance and does not render it void on its face. This 
would put it outside the ambit of $ 4  78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2. The challenge here was that 
failure to acknowledge the deed subjected the sale to attack on grounds that statutory 
steps incident to perfection of the title had not been observed. 
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by means of a quitclaim deed, but failed to pay taxes or occupy 
the land. In reaffirming Hansen u. Morris, the court held that 
section 78-12-5.1 is 
a statute of repose, obviously intended to lay a t  rest claims 
against tax titles which are asserted more than four years after 
acquisition of a tax title under statutory proceedings, and where 
the record owner has not had possession during that period.26 
Having ruled that section 78-12-5.1 was a statute of repose, 
the court felt impelled to address itself to certain wording con- 
tained in both sections that allowed the party instituting the 
action or interposing the defense to proceed where he could show 
that he had been in possession, regardless how brief, within the 4 
years prior to commencement of the action or interposition of the 
defense. The court felt that the language was inconsistent with 
the statute's nature and purpose. After pointing out that an out- 
of-context reading of the statutes appeared to allow the dispos- 
sessed party to defeat an action by a tax title holder who had been 
in possession long after the statutory period had run by proving 
possession at  any time within the 4-year period prior to the ac- 
tion, the court stated: 
We believe the legislature had in mind a four-year statute of 
limitations barring claims against tax titles, which four-year 
period dated from the initiation of the tax title, during which 
period any claimant against the tax title must have had posses- 
sion of the property to protect any claim he might have. Any 
other interpretation does not square with the general nature and 
purpose of the act, and could lead to novel and, we believe, 
unintended results, so as to defeat the entire purpose of a statute 
that seems to be designed to settle, not confuse, and to make 
certain, not uncertain, titles based on statutory liquidation of 
tax charges.27 
The court made it clear that the 4-year period dated from initia- 
tion of the title; the delinquent taxpayer would have to assert his 
interest during that period or be forever barred. 
C. Stability of Tax Titles Undermined: Lyman v. National 
Mortgage Bond Corp. 
Any stability that  tax titles may have achieved under 
Hansen and Peterson was nullified by Lyman u. National Mort- 
26. 6 Utah 2d a t  361, 313 P.2d a t  815. 
27. Id. a t  362, 313 P.2d at 816. This issue was not squarely before the court. 
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gage Bond Corp. 2n In Lyman, the plaintiffs predecessor in inter- 
est exclusively and openly possessed property obtained from the 
county by a tax deed. Plaintiff and his predecessor had main- 
tained exclusive and open possession continuously after the deed 
was issued, but had failed to pay taxes on the property before the 
taxes became delinquent. The property had been redeemed, how- 
ever, through payment of taxes prior to the May sale of each year 
after issuance of the deed. The court perceived the issue as 
whether or not the plaintiff's failure to pay the assessed taxes 
before they became delinquent prevented the court from quieting 
title in the plaintiff pursuant to the short statutes of limitation. 
Both the limitation of actions and adverse possession provi- 
sos were before the court. Plaintiff urged that the four provisos 
were not to be read together, but instead were distinct in purpose 
and conceptually distinguishable in application. Plaintiffs argu- 
ment appears to have been that sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2 
qualified him to bring the action and entitled him to a quieted 
title even absent his adverse possession and payment of taxes. 
Read separately, the limitation of actions sections, 78-12-5.1 and 
78-12-5.2, allow a tax title holder of 4 or more years to bar claims 
or defenses by a legal title holder regardless of whether the tax 
title holder possessed the property or paid taxes. Sections 78-12- 
7.1 and 78-12-12.1, on the other hand, were traditional adverse 
possession statutes requiring continuous possession and payment 
of taxes.2" 
The court conceded that a strict interpretation of the stat- 
utes would dictate a holding for the plaintiff. In its interpretation, 
however, the court read all four provisos together and ruled that 
sections 78-12-7.1 and 78-12-12.1 required establishment of a 
valid claim to the property by continuous possession and the 
payment of taxes before the limitation of actions statutes would 
operate to bar defenses to actions challenging the tax title, even 
though sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2 did not expressly so pro- 
vide.'V'he court reasoned that the plaintiff must succeed on the 
strength of his own claim or title-not the weakness inherent in 
the defendant's case through his failure to occupy or possess the 
property during the statutory period." Since payment of a delin- 
quent tax was held not to constitute payment of taxes within the 
- -- - 
28. 7 Utah 2d 123, 320 P.2d 322 (1958) 
29. Id. at 124-26, 320 P.2d at 323-24. 
20. Id. at 126-27, 320 P.2d at 324-25. 
31. Id. at 127, 320 P.2d at 325. 
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meaning of the adverse possession provisos, plaintiff did not es- 
tablish a valid claim to the property.32 
The court also found constitutional objections to plaintiff's 
bifurcated reading of the statutes. To construe the statutes to bar 
defendants from presenting claims where plaintiff established no 
valid claim to the property was said to constitute a deprivation 
of property without due process of law? 
Traditionally, tax titles were perfected either by proving 
strict compliance with statutory prerequisites for the issuing of 
tax titles" or by establishing rights by adverse possession.:~As 
part of Utah's remedial legislation, the rigid rules requiring proof 
of all steps in the taxation process in order to perfect title were 
amended to provide that a tax deed would be regarded as prima 
facie evidence of the regularity of all proceedings subsequent to 
the preliminary sale "and of the conveyance of the property to the 
grantee in fee simple."" The purpose of the short statutes of 
limitation was to provide a period of time for the validity of the 
tax deed and proceeding to be challenged, after which the dispos- 
sessed landowner's rights to recovery would be cut off. 
Lyman brings into focus the problems which, inherent in the 
statutes or judicially contrived, prevent effective application of 
the statutes. The problems that merit comment here are (1) the 
fundamental conceptual distinction between the limitation of 
actions and the adverse possession provisos, (2) the requirement 
of possession as a prerequisite to invoking the two limitation of 
actions statutes, and (3) the computation of the statutory period 
in the limitation of actions statute and the prescriptive period for 
ownership under the adverse possession statutes. 
32. Id. at  125-26, 320 P.2d at 323-24. For a contrary view see Justice Worthen's 
dissent. Id. a t  128-32, 320 P.2d at  326-28. 
33. 7 Utah 2d at  128, 320 P.2d at  325. 
34. See, e.g., Salt Lake Home Builders, Inc. v. Colman, 30 Utah 2d 370, 383, 518 P.2d 
165, 167 (1974) noted in 1974 ~ J T A H  1,. REV. 121; Olsen v. Bagley, 10 Utah 492, 495, 37 P .  
739, 740 (1894). 
35. IJTAH CODE ANN. (i 78-12-7 to -12 (1953); see Lyman v. National Mortgage Bond 
Corp., 7 Utah 2d 123, 320 P.2d 322 (1958). 
36. ~ J T A H  CODE ANN. (i 59-10-64(5) (1953). See also Pender v. Alix, 11 Utah 2d 58, 61, 
354 P.2d 1066, 1068 (1960) (dissenting opinion). 
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A. Limitation of Actions vs. Adverse Possession 
I .  Limitation of actions 
The prevailing rule that statutes of limitation are statutes of 
repose is based in part upon the proposition that persons who 
sleep upon their rights may lose them.s7 They are designed to 
compel the exercise of a right within a reasonable time and to 
suppress stale claims.sR While the individual derives the immedi- 
ate benefit from the operation of a statute of repose,:Vhe public 
is also benefited by the stimulation of activity and the promotion 
of security in human affairs."'This policy of repose may be out- 
weighed if the interests of justice require vindication of the barred 
party's rights, as where the party has not been negligent, but 
rather has been innocently prevented from asserting his rights? 
The short or special statutes of limitation were designed to 
establish comparatively short periods of time, running in favor of 
the holder of the tax title, after which the statutory presumption 
of the regularity of the proceeding and the validity of the title 
could not be q u e ~ t i o n e d . ~ ~  
The constitutionality of these short statutes of limitation is 
generally not an issue. Unless forbidden by their state constitu- 
tions, state legislatures may constitutionally shorten the period 
fixed by previously existing statutes?The United States Su- 
preme Court has long sustained shortened statutes that limit the 
period in which the prima facie evidence of regularity can be 
rebutted as complying with due process requirementsdd as long as 
notice requirements are met .'"ections 78-12-5 .I and 78-12-5.2 
37. Ashton-Jenkins Co. v. Bramel, 56 Utah 587, 596, 192 P. 375, 378 (1920); see 
Rurnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United 
States, 304 U.S. 126, 136 (1938). 
38. Chase Security Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). 
39. Kyle v. Green Acres, Inc., 44 N.J. 100, 110, 207 A.2d 513, 519 (1965). 
40. Id. at  108, 207 A.2d a t  517; see Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879). 
41. E.R., Housing Authority v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 25 N.J. 330, 342-43, 136 
A.2d 401, 408 (1957). 
42. E.R., Layton v. Holt, 22 Utah 2d 138, 139-40, 449 P.2d 986, 987 (1969); Peterson 
v .  Callister, 6 Utah 2d 359, 362, 313 P.2d 814, 816 (1957). 
43. Ochoa v. Hernandez, 230 U.S. 139, 161-62 (1913). 
44. Bardon v. Land & River Improvement Co., 157 U.S. 327, 333 (1895). 
45. Notice is still a volatile issue. Most states' taxing statutes, including Utah's, 
provide for notice by publication where notice is required during the tax sale proceedings. 
The universal exception is notice of assessment, which is generally mailed. The represent- 
ative IJtah statutes are I~TAH CODE ANN. Ej 59-10-10 (notice of assessment by mailing); § 
59-10-29 (notice of delinquent list by publication); and 5 59-10-64 (1953) (notice of final 
sales by publication). Notice by publication, however, has come under substantial fire. 
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withstood due process and equal protection challenges made be- 
fore the Supreme Court of Utah in Hansen u. Morris.'" 
Short statutes of limitation do not operate as a bar against 
attack where the deed does not describe the property sold a t  a tax 
sale or where the description is so vague or erroneous that the 
property in question cannot be identified." Insufficiency of de- 
scription, however, is a question of fact? 
Special or short statutes of limitation do not run where the 
tax deed is absolutely void on its face-not merely voidable-due 
to some jurisdictional defect" or where the jurisdictional defect, 
not apparent on the face of the deed, entails an irregularity in the 
proceedings." The statutes do not run even where the tax title 
holder takes possession of the land and occupies it for the pre- 
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950), the Supreme 
Court said: 
[Wlhen notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not due 
process. The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually inform- 
ing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. 
Mullane involved a court action for settlement of accounts where published notice was 
held to be inadequate. The Mullane rule has been applied in condemnation cases to 
invalidate notice by publication. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); 
Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956). 
Clearly the Mullane rule has application to residents known to the taxing authorities 
where personal service or service by mailing are logical and reasonable means of complying 
with the stricter standard. Publication or posting are still necessary, however, and are 
often the only feasible means where the owners are unknown or nonresidents. Legg, Tax 
Sales and the Constitution, 20 Okla. L. Rev. 365, 375-76 (1967). 
The Mullane rule has not been applied to tax sales. There is a substantial body of 
case law that permits the conclusion that perhaps publication or posting is sufficient on 
grounds that with ownership of property comes the implied knowledge that the property 
is subject to taxation; therefore the owner is ipso facto on notice of losing his property 
when he fails to pay the assessed tax. Legg, supra at  368-69. See also Leigh v. Green, 193 
U.S. 79, 88 (1904); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
46. See text accompanying notes 17-23 supra. But see Kanawha & Hocking Coal & 
Coke Co. v. Carbon County, No. 13853 (Sup. Ct. Utah, May 6, 1975) (dissenting opinion). 
47. Redfield v. Parks, 132 U.S. 239, 251 (1889); Crisman v. Johnson, 23 Colo. 264, 
268-70, 47 P. 296, 298 (1896); Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310, 315, 283 P.2d 884, 887 
(1955); Denny v. Stevens, 52 Wyo. 253, 259-60, 73 P.2d 308, 310 (1937). 
48. Bird v. Benlisa, 142 U.S. 664 (1892); Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310, 283 P.2d 
884 (1955). Examples of jurisdictional defects include situations in which (1) the land sold 
at the tax sale was not subject to taxation; (2) the land sold was not subject to the taxes 
for which it was sold, Mecham v. Mel-O-Tone Enterprises, 23 Utah 2d 403, 464 P.2d 392 
(1970); (3) taxes for which the land was sold were never assessed, Huntington City v. 
Peterson, 30 Utah 2d 408, 518 P.2d 1246 (1974); (4) the assessment was void, Keller v. 
Chournos, 102 Utah 535, 133 P.2d 318 (1943); and (5) the taxes had been paid, and there 
had been an incorrect duplicate assessment, Cameron Estates, Inc. v. Deering, 308 N.Y. 
24, 123 N.E.2d 621 (1954). 
49. Moore v. Brown, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 414, 426 (1850). 
50. Bird v. Benlisa, 142 U.S. 664, 666 (1892). 
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scribed period." In most states, however, where the deed is valid 
on its face and is voidable merely for some irregularity in the 
proceeding, the limiting statute runs from the date of execution 
and delivery of the deed or, in some cases, from the date of record- 
ing, regardless of possession." But where the tax deed is void on 
jurisdictional grounds, the general rule is that the party claiming 
under the void deed must prove actual possession for the statu- 
tory period in order to perfect title. This application shows the 
interplay between, and the distinctive roles of, a limiting statute 
and an adverse possession statute in a short statutes-of-limitation 
package. 
2. Adverse possession 
The very act of claiming title by adverse possession for a 
statutory period precludes the idea of a valid paper title."Where 
the statute under which the tax title holder claims is considered 
to be of the same nature as a general statute of limitations for 
lands held in adverse possession and the deed, valid on its face, 
appears to convey title to the land, the tax deed is regarded as 
having "color of title" even though it is void and fails as a convey- 
ance? 
Color of title is important only insofar as it gives the adverse 
possessor of part of the property constructive possession of the 
whole for the purpose of acquiring prescriptive title there- 
to"- provided, however, tha t  the portion claimed under con- 
51. See Jackson v. Irion, 196 La. 728, 200 So. 18 (1941). 
52. Taylor v. Miles, 5 Kan. 498, 7 Am. R. 558 (1870); Peterson v. Callister, 6 Utah 
2d 359, 313 P.2d 814 (1957). 
53. Central Pac. Ry. v. Tarpey, 51 Utah 107, 114, 168 P. 554, 556 (1917). 
54. Valley Inv. Co. v. Los Angeles & S.L.R.R., 119 Utah 169, 225 P.2d 722 (1950); 
Rozievich v. Slechta, 109 Utah 373, 166 P.2d 239 (1946); Baker v. Goodman, 57 Utah 349, 
194 P. 117 (1920); Welner v. Stearns, 40 Utah 185, 120 P. 490 (1911). See also Nicholas v. 
Giles, 102 Ariz. 130, 426 P.2d 398 (1967); Kimble v. Allen, 298 P.2d 1042 (Okla. 1956). 
55. Defective deeds have been held to give color of title where (1) the limiting statute 
for valid deeds was unconstitutional, Bradbury v. Dumond, 80 Ark. 82,96 S.W. 390 (1906); 
(2) the tax judgment was void, Woodside v. Durham, 317 Mo. 15, 295 S.W. 772 (1927); 
Rozievich v. Slechta, 109 Utah 373, 166 P.2d 239 (1946); (3) the assessment was void, 
Florida Fin. Co. v. Sheffield, 56 Fla. 285, 48 So. 42 (1908); (4) the sale was conducted a t  
a time and place other than those designated by law, Bennet v. North Colorado Springs 
Land & Improvement Co., 23 Colo. 470, 48 P .  812 (1897); Carney v. Anderson, 214 Miss. 
504, 58 So. 2d 13 (1952); (5) the tax deed, void on its face, was not sufficient to set the 
limiting statute in motion, Matthews v. Blake, 16 Wyo. 116,92 P. 242 (1907); and (6) there 
was failure to comply with statutory prerequisites for the sale itself, such as the failure of 
the auditor to aHix his affidavit and publication of sale for less than the statutory period, 
Rozievich v. Slechta, 109 Utah 373, 166 P.2d 239 (1946). 
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structive possession is not in actual possession by another? An 
instrument serves as color of title only where the location and 
identity of the property are accurately described." When land is 
held under such color of title after open, notorious, continuous, 
exclusive, and hostile possession for the statutory period, good 
legal title vests in the tax title holder or his successors in interest. 
Any right of recovery by the dispossessed legal owner or his suc- 
cessors in interest is cut off." Some jurisdictions impose a further 
requirement that the grantee of the tax sale deed proceed in good 
faith in the purchase and receipt of the tax deed in order to 
perfect his title by adverse possession," even though this require- 
ment is not expressed in the statute? 
Where a tax deed is not valid on its face, there is a split of 
authority concerning whether or not it constitutes color of title. 
The majority rule is that where a tax deed invalid on its face 
follows the ordinary form for such deeds, is executed by an official 
having authority to issue tax deeds, and purports to convey land 
by description accurate enough to permit identification, it will 
qualify as color of title under adverse possession statutes." But 
even where the tax deed is valid on its face, it does not give color 
of title if the description of the property is inadequate to permit 
identification." A few cases, however, totally reject the color of 
title concept where the deed is invalid on its face? 
B. The Requirement of Possession Under the Provisos 
The holding in Lyman, that the tax title holder or his succes- 
sor must establish possession and payment of taxes before the 
limitation of actions sections can be invoked to bar a defense, 
presents two problems. First, it ignores the concept of possession 
through seisin by a valid deed (not to be confused with color of 
56. McCay v. Parks, 201 Ala. 647, 649, 79 So. 119, 121 (1918); Central Pac. Ry. v. 
Tarpey, 51 Utah 107, 114, 168 P. 554, 556 (1917); Welner v. Stearns, 40 Utah 185, 195, 
120 P. 490, 493 (1911). 
57. This concept is to be distinguished from the possession by a naked trespasser 
without color of title, which is limited to the area of his actual possession. 
58. See Central Pac. Ry. v. Tarpey, 51 Utah 107, 114, 168 P. 554, 556 (1917). 
59. Pratt v. Parker, 57 N.M. 103, 255 P.2d 311 (1953). 
60. E.g . ,  Bower v. Cohen, 126 Ga. 35, 40-42, 54 S.E. 918, 920-21 (1906). 
61. See Deputron v. Young, 134 U.S. 241, 254 (1890); Lawrence v. Murphy, 45 Utah 
572, 147 P. 903 (1915). 
62. Horsky v. McKennan, 53 Mont. 50,57, 162 P. 376,379 (1916); Sanchez v. Garcia, 
72 N.M. 406, 410, 384 P.2d 681, 683 (1963). 
63. Redfield v. Parks, 132 U S .  239, 251-52 (1889); Matthews v. Blake, 16 Wyo. 116, 
124, 92 P. 242, 243 (1907). 
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title where the deed is merely valid on its face), which has never 
required payment of taxes to establish rights of ownership. Sec- 
ond, section 78-12-5.2, as a statute of repose, is subverted where 
the dispossessed party or his successor in interest may assert 
rights in the property indefinitely after the May sale, provided 
that he or his succesor has possessed the property at  any time 
during the 4 years prior to commencement of the action or inter- 
position of the defense. 
In Utah, the grantee at a tax sale (or the county where no 
party purchases) takes a new and paramount title in fee simple.64 
Under traditional concepts of real property law and limitation of 
action statutes generally, a party seised of property need not be 
in possession to maintain an action for recovery or posse~sion.~ 
Although the term "seisin" has no precise or definite meaning in 
American jurisprudence, it is generally thought of as the force of 
possession under a deed, as opposed to possession or occupancy 
in fact." Therefore, where the tax title constitutes a valid title 
and represents seisin of the land, possession in fact should not be 
required. 
The payment of taxes is not relevant in determining rights 
in a quiet title action that is premised on theories other than 
adverse possession. Traditionally, payment of taxes has been one 
of the elements that manifests and supports open, notorious, and 
exclusive possession adverse to the owner of the legal tit1eY 
Under Utah's adverse possession provisos, payment of taxes sup- 
ports a curious kind of presumed or constructive possession, ap- 
parently because the tax title gives color of title only.6x But where 
a party shows possession by seisin or force of possession under a 
completely valid deed, nonpayment of taxes should be irrelevant 
to the determination of his relative strength of title for purposes 
of succeeding in a quiet title suit, unless, of course, he has been 
disseised, himself, by a tax sale. 
This reasoning invalidates the majority opinion in Lyman, 
where the threshold question of the validity of the tax deed was 
never reached? Payment of taxes should not have been required 
64.  ITA AH CODE ANN. $ 4  59-10-64(5) to  (7) (1953); see Welner v. Steams, 40 Utah 185, 
194, 120 P. 490, 493 (1911). For a more extensive discussion of the nature of tax titles in 
lltah see Comment, supra note 6. 
65. See IJTAH CODE ANN. 4 78-12-5 (1953). 
66. Ford v. Garner's Adm'r, 49 Ala. 601 (1873); Kanawha & Hocking Coal & Coke 
Co. V. Carbon County, No. 13853 (Sup. Ct. Utah, May 6, 1975). 
67. Bowen v. Olson, 2 Utah 2d 12, 15, 268 P.2d 983, 985 (1954). 
68. See text accompanying notes 53-54 supra. 
69. Lyman v. National Mortgage Bond Corp., 7 Utah 2d 123, 127, 320 P.2d 322, 325 
(1958). 
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if the tax deed was valid since the tax title holder would have 
already established possession by seisin under the valid deed. 
This line of reasoning is supported by the general rule and policy 
of most limitation of actions statutes of this nature that neither 
actual possession nor payment of taxes by the tax title holder is 
required to invoke the ~ t a t u t e . ~ "  
The nature of the tax title as legal title draws into question 
the use of the language "owner of a legal title" found in section 
78-12-5.2. It is clear from the context of this section that the 
statute is referring to the party dispossessed of his property a t  a 
tax sale for failure to pay taxes. In reality, and consistent with 
the notion that the tax title is a new and paramount title, the 
holder of the tax deed is the owner of the legal title. 
The second problem, pertaining to the nature of section 78- 
12-5.2 as a statute of repose undermined by the possession excep- 
tion, was raised by the majority in Peterson v. Call i~ter .~ '  If sec- 
tion 78-12-5.2 is to be consistent with the purpose of the limiting 
statutes in a tax title contest, it must establish a time after which 
no challenges may be brought. Allowing the dispossessed party to 
circumvent the statute and assert rights to the property a t  any 
time in the future by proving actual possession-regardless how 
brief-during the 4 years prior to the action, works to preserve 
stale claims, condones negligence, and adds insecurity to human 
affairs in flagrant disregard of all policy considerations and objec- 
tives of such statutes. 
C. Computation of  the  Statutory Period 
Both limiting statutes, sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2, pro- 
vide a statutory period ending "four years after the date of the 
tax deed, conveyance, or transfer creating such tax title," during 
which claims may be asserted. Whether this language was in- 
tended to mean that the statute commences to run the day of the 
private sale (where one is held), upon termination of the redemp- 
tion period, or the date of the May sale is unclear. There is neither 
statutory expression nor judicial pronouncement on the issue 
short of a statement that the period commences 4 years from the 
date of conveyance creating the tax title .72 
The answer is contained in the resolution of the question of 
when a tax title is initiated. The dispossessed landowner has a 
70. See note 52 and accompanying text supra. 
71. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra. 
72. See note 27 and accompanying text supra. 
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statutory right of redemption during the period between the pre- 
liminary sale in the January following delinquency and April lst, 
4 years later.73 Any properties or interests purchased by tax sale 
during that period are subject to redemption. During the redemp- 
tion period, the purchaser takes only an equity in the property 
that carries with it no right of possession. This right of possession 
ripens into an absolute title only when the delinquent party fails 
to redeem.?"ince a tax title, by judicial determination, is abso- 
lute in q~al i ty ,~"  "tax title" does not really become a tax title 
until the redemption period e n d ~ . ~ T h e  limiting period for adju- 
dication of rights, therefore, should commence upon the termina- 
tion of the redemption period in the case of private sales, or on 
the date of the May sale where the delinquent properties are sold 
to the public or struck off to the county. 
The foregoing construction has distinct advantages. First, it 
gives the dispossessed party whose land is sold at  sale prior to the 
May sale additional time to assert any rights-without under- 
mining the objectives of limiting statutes. Moreover, the addi- 
tional time might serve to appease courts that are reluctant to 
uphold forfeitures occasioned by tax sales. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The problem areas raised by Lyman and discussed in the 
preceding section can be resolved by minor legislative amend- 
ments to the limiting statutes. As no theoretical or linguistic 
inconsistency appears to burden the adverse possession statutes, 
no recommendations for amendment with respect to them are 
made. 
A. The Possession Requirement 
In order to give tax titles a degree of certainty, the primary 
objective of the short statutes of limitation is to establish rela- 
tively short periods of time after which the statutory presumption 
of the regularity of the proceeding and the validity of the title 
cannot be questioned. In keeping with this goal, section 78-12-5.2 
73. [ITAH CODE ANN. 5 59-10-56 (1953); Comment, supra note 6; 3 UTAH L. REV. 97, 
100 (1952). 
74. [ITAH COIW ANN. 5 59-10-64(1), (5) (1953) (when sold a t  May sale); § 59-10-64(1), 
(6) (1953) (when struck off to county). 
75. See note 61 supra. 
76. For a good discussion of this concept see Crisman v. Johnson, 23 Colo. 264, 271- 
72, 47 P. 296, 299 (1896). 
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should be amended by deleting the portion of the proviso that 
prevents the statute from barring an action or defense by the 
dispossessed landowner or his successor in interest where he can 
show actual possession a t  any time within the 4-year period that 
immediately precedes the action or defense. This deletion would 
serve to require the dispossessed landowner to bring his action 
within the 4-year period following creation of the tax title or be 
forever barred. It would prevent him from sleeping on his rights 
for years and then bringing an action or interposing a defense 
simply by showing that he occupied the property within the 4 
years prior to the commencement of the action or interposition of 
the defense. 
The proposed amended statute should read as follows: 
No action or defense for the recovery or possession of real prop- 
erty or to quiet title or determine the ownership thereof shall be 
commenced or interposed against the holder of a tax title after 
the expiration of four years from the date of the sale, conveyance 
or transfer of such tax title to any county, or directly to any 
other purchaser thereof at  any public or private tax sale and 
after the expiration of one year from the date of this act 
[deletion]. [Plrovided, [however], that this section shall not 
bar any defense by a city or town, to an action by the holder of 
a tax title to the effect that such city or town holds a lien against 
such property which is equal or superior to the claim of the 
holder of such tax title.77 
To achieve consistency with the parent limiting statute (sec- 
tion 78-12-5) and statutes of limitation generally having to do 
with actions for the recovery or possession of real property, the 
possession limitation contained in section 78-12-5.1 should be 
amended to read: 
[Plrovided, however, that with respect to actions or defenses 
brought or interposed for the recovery or possession of or to quiet 
title or determine ownership of real property against the holder 
of a tax title to such property, no such action or defense shall 
be commenced or interposed more than four years after the date 
of the tax deed, conveyance, or transfer creating such tax title 
and no person may commence or interpose such action or de- 
fense unless that person or his predecessor has actually occupied 
such property within such four-year period.7R (Proposed amend- 
ment emphasized.) 
77. For current version see note 8 supra. This proposed amendment is consistent with 
the statutes applicable in neighboring jurisdictions. 
78. For the current version see note 11 supra. This proposed amendment, less the 
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B. Computation of the  Statutory Period 
The definitional section should be amended as follows: 
The term "tax title" as used in section 78-12-5.2 and section 59- 
10-65, and the related amended sections 78-12-5, 78-12-7, and 
78-12-12, means that title to real property, whether valid or not, 
which has been derived through or is dependent upon any sale, 
conveyance or transfer of such property in the course of a statu- 
tory proceeding for the liquidation of any tax levied against such 
property whereby the property is relieved from a tax lien. A n  
interest i n  real property obtained at a tax sale becomes a tax 
title upon termination of the redemption period i n  the case of  
property sold pursuant to section 59-10-37 and upon t heda t e  of  
final sale in the case of property sold pursuant to section 59-1 0- 
64.'!' (Proposed amendment emphasized.) 
This amendment recognizes that the purchaser a t  a tax sale has 
no title until after the redemption period or upon final sale and 
that the statutes of limitation would commence to run a t  the time 
the equity matures into a legal title. 
Eighteen years ago, a local author exposed the dilemma occa- 
sioned by Lyman and astutely urged the legislature to take 
corrective action.H0 It is obvious now, as i t  was then, that the 
Supreme Court of Utah, given its aversion to property forfeitures 
of any kind, is unlikely to back down from Lyman, even though 
the opinion is fraught with theoretical inconsistencies. Given the 
increasing number of properties that proceed to tax sales in Utah, 
and the need to engender public interest and confidence in tax 
titles in order to place delinquent properties back into a revenue 
generating posture, it is apparent that either the problems be 
resolved, or we brace ourselves for taxation in another sector to 
raise requisite revenues and abandon hope of ever purchasing 
realty free of tax title clouds. Legislative attention must be di- 
rected toward resolving this critical problem brought about by 
the current ambiguous statutory language, judicial disenchant- 
ment with tax titles generally, and confusion with regard to the 
possession requirement, is consistent with the statutes applicable in neighboring 
jurisdictions. See note 8 supra. 
79. For relevant portions of the current version see text accompanying note 16 supra. 
80. See 6 IJTAH I,. REV. 284 (1958). 
4571 STATUTES OF LIMITATION FOR TAX TITLES 475 
short statutes of limitation specifically. Until the legislature 
amends the present statutes, the cloud over this area of the law 
will grow darker and more ominous. 
